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Abstract
The purpose of testing a system with respect to a requirement is to refute the hypothesis
that the system satisfies the requirement. We build a theory of tests and refutation based on
the elementary notions of satisfaction and refinement. We use this theory to characterize the
requirements that can be refuted through black-box testing and, dually, verified through such tests.
We consider refutation in finite time and obtain the finite falsifiability of hyper-safety temporal
requirements as a special case. We extend our theory with computational constraints and separate
refutation from enforcement in the context of temporal hyper-properties. Overall, our theory
provides a basis to analyze the scope and reach of black-box tests and to bridge results from
diverse areas including testing, verification, and enforcement.
Keywords. Testing; Refutation; Black-box Systems
1 Introduction
Problem. In black-box testing, the internal structure of the system under test, including its hardware
and the algorithms and data structures implemented, are unknown to the tester. The need for black-box
testing arises when testers have no access to, or auxiliary information about, the system under test,
other than what they can observe by interacting with the system over its interface, e.g., by providing
the system with inputs and observing its outputs.
Despite the simplicity of the black-box setting and the manifest importance of testing in general,
the theory of black-box testing is under-developed and a solid understanding of its strength and limi-
tations is lacking. For instance, it is commonly agreed upon that the purpose of testing a system with
respect to a requirement is to refute the hypothesis that the system satisfies the requirement [16, 36].
Yet existing testing theory is inadequate for answering basic questions in the black-box setting such
as: which class of requirements are refutable, given a class of tests? Or, which class of tests, if any,
can refute a class of requirements?
We develop a theory of black-box testing that explicates what can be determined about systems by
observing their behavior. Our theory fully characterizes the class of refutable and verifiable require-
ments. This means it precisely specifies for which system requirements the violation (respectively
satisfaction) can, or cannot, be demonstrated through black-box tests. Establishing the limits of test-
ing this way is analogous to establishing elementary results in complexity theory that delimit the
boundaries of effective computation. Moreover, our theory helps testers understand the consequences
of implicit assumptions they may be making when carrying out tests, for example, that systems are
deterministic. Our theory also provides a foundation for bridging results in testing with related disci-
plines.
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Approach. We start with an abstract model of systems and requirements (§2) and introduce two
types of requirements: obligations and prohibitions (§3). A requirement is an obligation if it obliges
the systems to exhibit certain (desired) behaviors, and it is a prohibition if it prohibits the systems from
exhibiting (undesired) behaviors. Here, a behavior could be, for example, sets of input/output pairs, or
sets of traces. Functional requirements are typically obligations, and security requirements are, by and
large, prohibitions. We show that these two requirement types admit a straightforward order-theoretic
characterization. Namely, given a refinement (or abstraction) partial-order on a set of systems, the
satisfaction of an obligation is abstraction-closed, and for a prohibition it is refinement-closed.
We turn next to black-box tests (§4). Given a black-box system, the tester can observe its input
and output, but cannot observe how the latter is produced from the former. The tester can therefore
analyze such a system only by interacting with it over its interface, and not by, for example, analyzing
its software. In black-box testing, sometimes called “testing by sampling” [16], testing amounts
to inspecting a sample of system behaviors. The sample obtained through tests can be seen as a
refinement of the system under test, a notion we make precise in subsequent sections. All a tester
learns by sampling is that the system exhibits certain behaviors. From this, the tester cannot infer
that the system does not exhibit other behaviors as well. Such a conclusion could only be justified
through the sample’s exhaustiveness, which black-box testing alone cannot establish. A requirement
is therefore refutable through tests if, for any system that violates the requirement, the hypothesis that
the system satisfies the requirement can be refuted by inspecting a refinement of the system.
It follows that a requirement whose violation is contingent upon demonstrating the absence of
behaviors cannot be refuted through black-box testing. Based on this, we prove that any refutable
requirement is a prohibition, and all non-trivial obligations are irrefutable (§5). We then define the
notion of verification dual to refutation, and show that any verifiable requirement is an obligation and
that non-trivial prohibitions cannot be verified through tests (§6).
The theory sketched above is aimed to delimit the scope and reach of black-box testing in general.
However, it does not account for two central limitations of black-box tests in practice: testing must
proceed in a finite amount of time, and test oracles must be computable. We specialize our theory
to accommodate these limitations. Namely, we introduce the notions of finite refutability (and dually
finite verifiability), and characterize the class of finitely refutability (verifiable) requirements (§7).
Our main result here relates finitely refutable temporal requirements to safety properties and hyper-
safety hyper-properties. We further specialize the theory by considering the case when test oracles are
constrained to be computable (§8). We use this specialization to separate properties that are refutable
from those that are enforceable by runtime monitoring.
While §7 and §8 pertain to specializations of our black-box testing theory, in §9 we consider a
generalization: testing in the grey-box setting where testers may have partial information about the
system under test. It is not surprising that access to auxiliary information can enlarge the set of
refutable requirements. Our main result here is to show that refutation with the help of auxiliary
information can be reduced to the task of refuting a prohibition. This result further illustrates the tight
connection between prohibitions and refutability mentioned above. We also use this generalization to
explicate the assumptions that are implicit in several well-known testing techniques (§10).
Overall, we present a basic theory for reasoning about the strength and limitations of black-box
testing. Our theory is abstract and has minimal formal machinery, which makes it easy to extend. We
present specializations and generalizations that account for refutation in finite time, refutation under
computational constraints, and refutation aided by auxiliary information. We use these to prove new
results and to obtain known results as special cases, as explained in the following.
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Contributions. Our first contribution is the theory sketched above. We use it to fully characterize
the requirements that can be refuted and those that can be verified through black-box tests. Our proofs
are short; they often amount to simply unrolling definitions. This suggests that our theory is at the
right level of abstraction for reasoning about black-box tests, a claim which is further supported by
observing that the theory lends itself to direct, straightforward extensions, as discussed above.
Our second contribution is to show how our theory can be used to derive both known and new
results in a straightforward way. In particular, we present different applications of our theory of finite
refutability (§7). For instance, we demonstrate that the finite falsifiability of hyper-safety temporal
requirements established by Clarkson and Schneider [14] can be derived as a special case in our
theory. As another example, we use our characterization to separate refutability from enforceability:
we show that any enforceable temporal requirement is refutable, but refutable requirements need not
be enforceable. This separation hinges upon analyzing the computational constraints of refutation
(and enforcement) via a notion of algorithmically refutable requirements (§8). Moreover, the abstract
nature of our theory allows us to establish connections between algorithmic refutability, topology, and
recursion theory.
Our third contribution is to use our characterization of refutability through black-box tests to
augment and shed light on the folkloric understanding of testing that exists in the community. As
an example, consider Dijkstra’s statement that “program testing can be used to show the presence
of bugs, but never to show their absence”, which is widely quoted in software testing community.
We make precise a stronger version of this statement, and show that its proof is independent of the
cardinality of the input domain, i.e., the number of test cases one must consider. Moreover, we
use our characterization to rectify the folklore surrounding Dijkstra’s statement, for example, that
testing can never be used to establish that a system satisfies a requirement. As a second example,
we highlight the fundamental role that determinacy assumptions play in making sense of day-to-day
black-box functional tests (§9). In particular, we examine three prominent testing techniques, namely
functional testing, model-based testing, and fuzz testing, in light of our theory, and explicate their
implicit assumptions (§10). We discuss other related work in §11 and conclude by discussing the
limitations of our theory in §12.
Parts of the work described here were published in [47]. The current article extends this previ-
ous work with additional technical details, examples, and explanations, pertaining to the notions of
refutability, verifiability, and black-box testing. Moreover, the notion of refutability under auxiliary
assumptions (§9) as well as the systematic review of testing practice (§10) are entirely new.
2 Systems and Requirements
We give a simple abstract model of systems and requirements, the main ingredients of our theory.
A system is an entity that is capable of exhibiting observable behaviors. Operating systems, digital
circuits and vending machines are all examples of systems. We keep the notion of an observable
behavior unspecified for now and instead work with systems as a set of objects with an associated
partial order. Namely, let D denote the nonempty set of all systems under consideration, which is
our domain of discourse. We assume that (D,) is a partially-ordered set (poset), where  denotes
a refinement relation: S1  S2 means that S2 exhibits all the behaviors of S1. In this case, we say
system S1 refines system S2, or system S2 abstracts system S1.
There exists a large body of research on refinement and abstraction; see for instance [1, 34, 51].
Examples of refinement relations include trace containment and various algebraic simulation relations.
In the interest of generality, we do not bind  to any particular relation. We write ⌈S⌉ and ⌊S⌋
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respectively for the set of systems that abstract a system S and those that refine it: ⌈S⌉ = {S′ ∈ D |
S  S′} and ⌊S⌋ = {S′ ∈ D | S′  S}. We assume that the poset (D,) is bounded: it has a
greatest element ⊤ and a least element ⊥. The “chaos” system ⊤ (sometimes called the “weakest”
system [27]), abstracts every system, and the “empty” system ⊥ refines every system in D. In short,
our system model is a four-tuple (D,,⊥,⊤).
We remark that ⊤ and ⊥ are fictitious entities in the sense that there is no need to construct them.
We will use⊤ to reason about the testers’ epistemic limitations. In contrast, ⊥ is, strictly speaking, not
necessary for our theory’s development. We introduce it for the sake of symmetry and as a shorthand
for “empty” systems.
We extensionally define a requirement to be a set of systems. A system satisfies a requirement R
if it belongs to R. For example, the requirement stipulating that systems are deterministic consists
of all the deterministic systems in D. For now, we need not expound on the satisfaction relation
between systems and requirements; we will give examples later. We write χR for a requirement R’s
characteristic function, which maps D to {0, 1}. A requirement R is trivial if all or none of the
systems inD satisfy it, i.e. χR is a constant function iff R is trivial.
It is immediate that (R,⊆) is a complete lattice, where R is the set of all requirements and ⊆
is the standard set inclusion relation. We define the conjunction of two requirements R1 and R2,
denoted R1∧R2, as their meet, and their disjunction, denoted R1∨R2, as their join. For a nonempty
set R of systems, we write ⌈R⌉ = ⋃S∈R⌈S⌉ and ⌊R⌋ =
⋃
S∈R⌊S⌋. A set R is abstraction-closed
if R = ⌈R⌉, and refinement-closed if R = ⌊R⌋. Such a set is called an upper set, and respectively, a
lower set in order theory.
3 Requirement Types
We define obligations and prohibitions, and prove a lemma that separates these requirement types
(§3.1). Afterward, we characterize the requirements that can be expressed as the conjunction of an
obligation and a prohibition (§3.2). Finally, we present an intuitive interpretation of obligations and
prohibitions as, respectively, lower-bounds and upper-bounds on system behaviors (§3.3).
3.1 Obligations and Prohibitions
A requirement is an obligation if it obliges the systems to exhibit certain (desired) behaviors, such
as intended functionalities and features. For example, a requirement for a database system obliges it
to provide the user with an option to commit transactions. This requirement cannot be violated by
adding behaviors to the system, for example by providing the user the option to review transactions.
The satisfaction of an obligation R is therefore abstraction-closed: ∀S, S′ ∈ D. S ∈ R ∧ S  S′ →
S′ ∈ R.
A requirement is a prohibition if it prohibits the systems from exhibiting certain (undesired) be-
haviors. For instance, consider the requirement that prohibits a database system from committing
malformed transactions. This requirement cannot be violated by removing behaviors from the sys-
tem, for example removing the option for committing transactions altogether. That is, the satisfaction
of a prohibition R is refinement-closed: ∀S, S′ ∈ D. S ∈ R ∧ S′  S → S′ ∈ R.
Rewriting the previous two formulas gives us the following definition.
Definition 1. A requirement R is an obligation if R = ⌈R⌉, and R is a prohibition if R = ⌊R⌋.
The following example illustrates the system model of §2, obligations, and prohibitions. The
example also introduces the extensional input-output system model eio, which we use throughout
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the paper. This model highlights two features of interactive systems that (1) distinguish between inputs
and outputs, and (2) react to any input, either by producing an output (including undesired ones, such
as throwing an exception or crashing) or by diverging, i.e. not terminating.
Example 1. Consider the system model (2N×N,⊆, ∅,N×N), where a system is extensionally defined
as a subset of N × N, with N being the set of natural numbers, and the refinement relation is the
standard subset relation. For an input i ∈ N, a system S produces an output o, non-deterministically
chosen from the set {n ∈ N | (i, n) ∈ S}, and it does not produce any outputs when {n ∈ N | (i, n) ∈
S} is empty. We call this system model eio. Note that, due to its extensional definition, this model
makes no distinctions between two systems that define the same subset of N × N but are otherwise
different, e.g., one of them runs faster than the other.
The requirement P stipulating that systems are deterministic is a prohibition: if S is deterministic,
meaning ∀i ∈ N. |{n ∈ N | (i, n) ∈ S}| ≤ 1, then so is any refinement, i.e. subset, of S. In particular,
the empty system satisfies the definition of determinacy.
The requirement O stipulating that systems define total relations is an obligation: if S is total,
meaning ∀i ∈ N. |{n ∈ N | (i, n) ∈ S}| > 0, then so is any abstraction, i.e. superset, of S. In
particular, ⊤ is total.
The requirement R, stating that systems extensionally define total functions, is clearly neither a
prohibition nor an obligation: from ∀i ∈ N. |{n ∈ N | (i, n) ∈ S}| = 1 we cannot conclude that an
arbitrary subset or superset of S defines a total function. Note that R = O ∧ P .
Two remarks are due here. First, Definition 1 qualifies the relationship between a requirement’s
satisfaction and the notion of refinement. Analogous formulations are found, for example, in logic.
A satisfiable sentence remains satisfiable after enlarging the set of models, whereas a valid sentence
remains valid after reducing the set of models. In this sense, obligations resemble satisfiability, and
prohibitions resemble validity.
Second, syntactically reformulating a requirement’s description does not affect its type. For exam-
ple, the prohibition stating that systems may not produce two (or more) different outputs for any input
can be syntactically reformulated as systems may produce at most one output for each input without
affecting its type. The latter formulation permits, and the former forbids, certain behaviors. As a sec-
ond example, the requirement F that forbids “doing nothing” is abstraction-closed, simply because
all systems except ⊥ satisfy F . That is, F is an obligation, in spite of the term “forbid” appearing in
its statement. In short, the syntactic disguise of a requirement plays no role in determining its type.
We now separate obligations and prohibitions by showing that a nontrivial requirement cannot
belong to both these types. A requirement R is an obligation iff χR is monotonically increasing in ,
that is, S  S′ → χR(S) ≤ χR(S′). Similarly, R is a prohibition iff χR is monotonically decreasing,
that is, S  S′ → χR(S′) ≤ χR(S). Therefore, any requirement that is both an obligation and a
prohibition must have a constant characteristic function and hence is trivial. The following lemma is
now immediate. (See Appendix A for all proofs.)
Lemma 1. If a requirement R is both an obligation and a prohibition, then R is trivial.
This lemma implies that a prohibition cannot be replaced with an obligation and vice versa. For
example, the prohibition smoking is forbidden has no equivalent obligation, and the obligation sac-
rifice a ram has no equivalent prohibition. The lemma does not however imply that obligations and
prohibitions exhaust the set of requirements. A non-monotone requirement, i.e. one whose char-
acteristic function is neither monotonically increasing nor monotonically decreasing, is neither an
obligation nor a prohibition. For instance, the requirement R = O ∧ P , defined in Example 1, is
neither an obligation nor a prohibition, as it is not monotone.
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Many practically-relevant requirements turn out to be the conjunction of an obligation and a pro-
hibition, similarly to R above. We generalize this to the notion of semi-monotonicity.
3.2 Semi-Monotonicity
A requirement is semi-monotone if it is the conjunction of two (or more) monotone requirements.
In §5 we show that, when it comes to refutability, a semi-monotone requirement behaves like a mono-
tone one, but only for some systems. This motivates studying semi-monotonicity.
Semi-monotonicity is strictly weaker than monotonicity. Consequently, obligations and prohibi-
tions are (trivially) semi-monotone, but a semi-monotone requirement need not belong to either of
these types. The following lemma states that obligations and prohibitions, closed under conjunction,
are necessary and sufficient for expressing all semi-monotone requirements. Note that, due to the
idempotence of ⌈·⌉ and ⌊·⌋, ⌈R⌉ is an obligation and ⌊R⌋ a prohibition for any requirement R.
Lemma 2. A requirement R is semi-monotone iff R = ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋.
Although semi-monotonicity holds for many requirements, not all requirements are semi-monotone,
as the following example illustrates.
Example 2. Consider the eio model and the requirement R that is satisfied by a system S if for each
(i, o) ∈ S there exists some (i′, o) ∈ S, with i 6= i′. This requirement, which can be seen as a
simplified form of a k-anonymity requirement [45], states that by solely inspecting a system’s outputs,
an observer cannot determine whether or not the input is some particular i ∈ N.
Consider the ascending chain of systems S0  S1  S2  · · · , where S0 = {(0, 0)}, and
Sj = Sj−1 ∪ {(j, o)}, where o = j/2 if j is even, and o = (j − 1)/2 otherwise. That is, S1 =
S0 ∪ {(1, 0)}, S2 = S1 ∪ {(2, 1)}, and so forth. Note that Sj satisfies R iff j is odd, with j ∈ N. The
diagram below illustrates χR with respect to the systems’ indices in the chain.
χR
N
1
0 1 2 3 4
It is easy to check that on any chain S0  S1  · · · , a monotone requirement’s characteris-
tic function changes its value at most once. A semi-monotone requirement’s characteristic function
changes at most once from 0 to 1, and at most once from 1 to 0. From the zigzagging χR of the above
diagram, it is evident that R is not semi-monotone.
Alternatively, note that ⌈R⌉∧⌊R⌋ = D 6= R, and hence R is not semi-monotone due to Lemma 2.
We conclude this section by remarking that semi-monotonicity is invariant under conjunction:∧
R∈ρR is semi-monotone for any nonempty set ρ of semi-monotone requirements (see the ap-
pendix for details). This justifies the practice of piece-wise specification of (semi-monotone) re-
quirements, e.g. one for negative integers and one for non-negative ones, and then combining them
with conjunction. Note however that semi-monotonicity is not an invariant under disjunction because
any nonempty requirement R is the disjunction of (infinitely many) semi-monotone requirements:
R =
∨
S∈R⌈S⌉ ∧ ⌊S⌋.
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Figure 1: The set of all behaviors is partitioned into the set of prohibited behaviors, represented by
the hatched area, and the set of permissible ones, represented by the white box. The set of obligatory
behaviors, represented by the oval, is included in the set of permissible behaviors. The triangle stands
for a system S’s behaviors. The white circle represents a violation of the obligation denoted by the
oval, and the black circle represents a violation of the prohibition depicted by the hatched area.
3.3 Lower-Bound and Upper-Bound Interpretations
Here we present an intuitive interpretation of obligations and prohibition that we illustrate using the
eio model. In the eio model, an obligation O is a set of systems that can be characterized also by a set
of desired behaviors. Any violation of O is therefore due to the behaviors that S lacks. Consequently,
O can be seen as a lower-bound for the set of S’s behaviors. Similarly, S satisfies a prohibition P
iff the set of behaviors of S is contained in the set of behaviors P permits. Any violation of P is
therefore due to excessive behaviors of S. In this sense, P gives rise to an upper-bound for the set
of S’s behaviors.
Example 3. Consider the eio system model, and the obligation O stating that a (non-deterministic)
system S must produce i + 1 as one of its possible outputs for every even input 2i. Then, S ∈ O ↔
F ⊆ S, where F = {(2i, i + 1) | i ∈ N}. Now, consider the prohibition P stating that a system
may only output i + 1 for an even input 2i, and for odd numbers the system never outputs 0. Then,
S ∈ P ↔ S ⊆ G, where G = F ∪ {(2i + 1, o+ 1) | i, o ∈ N}.
We can now express the satisfaction relation between S and R = O ∧ P as S ∈ R ↔ F ⊆ S ⊆
G. A system violates R iff it lacks a behavior of F , or it exhibits a behavior outside G.
The diagram of Figure 1 illustrates the lower-bound and upper-bound interpretations, where the
oval is the lower-bound and the white box is the upper-bound on system behaviors. A similar figure
is given in [46].
Two remarks are due here. First, interpreting prohibitions as a set of prohibited behaviors leads to
a natural definition of permissible behaviors. Namely, the set of permissible behaviors complements
the set of prohibited ones, cf. deontic logic [52]. To avoid inconsistency, all obligatory behaviors
must be permissible, but not all permissible behaviors need be obligatory. Consequently, the set of
permissible behaviors for a system, delimited by the prohibitions, does not necessarily coincide with
its set of obligatory behaviors, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Second, a requirement R that is not semi-monotone does not admit the lower-bound and upper-
bound interpretations: a system may violate R even when it is bounded from below and from above
by systems that satisfy R. As Example 2 shows, S1 ∈ R, S3 ∈ R, and S1  S2  S3 do not entail
S2 ∈ R.
4 Black-Box Tests
Recall that a system is a black-box if we can observe its input and output, but cannot observe how the
latter is produced from the former. In black-box testing, a tester can only interact with the system over
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its interface. We now characterize this in our system model. We start by defining a test setup, which
enables us to distinguish system behaviors from what a tester observes.
Let (D,,⊥,⊤) be a system model. By sampling the behaviors of a system S ∈ D, a tester
makes an observation. We do not further specify observations. We give examples shortly. A test
setup is a pair (T, α), where T is a domain of observations and α : D → 2T is an order-preserving
function, i.e., S  S′ → α(S) ⊆ α(S′).
Intuitively, the set α(S) consists of all the observations that can be made by testing a system S in
this test setup and a black-box test simply amounts to making an observation from this set. Since α
is order-preserving, if t belongs to α(S) for some system S, then t ∈ α(S′) for any system S′ that
abstracts S. This reflects the nature of black-box testing where analyzing a system S “by sampling”
amounts to inspecting a sample of S’s behaviors [16]. Therefore, if an observation can be made on S
by inspecting the behaviors S exhibits, then the same observation can also be made on any system S′
that abstracts S, simply because S′ exhibits all of S’s behaviors. We illustrate these notions with an
example.
Example 4. Consider the eio system model and the test setup Tr = (D, ⌊·⌋), where a tester may ob-
serve an arbitrary refinement of the system under test. Note that ⌊·⌋ is order-preserving and hence Tr
is a test setup. The subscript r indicates reflexivity: a system S is itself a legitimate observation on S
in the test setup Tr. In Section 5.1, we explain reflexive test setups in detail.
Suppose a tester observes that a system S outputs 0 on input 0, and 1 on input 1. That is, the
tester makes the observation t = {(0, 0), (1, 1)} on S, which is a refinement of S. Clearly ⊤ could
also yield t, simply because t ∈ ⌊⊤⌋.
We define the function αˆ : T → 2D to map an observation to the set of systems that can yield that
observation. Formally, αˆ(t) = {S ∈ D | t ∈ α(S)}, for any t ∈ T . In black-box testing, a tester
knows nothing about the behaviors of the system under test beyond what is observed by interacting
with it. Therefore, all the tester can conclude from an observation t is that the system under test can be
any system that could yield t. That is, solely based on an observation t, the tester cannot distinguish
between the system under test and any other system in αˆ(t). We call this the indistinguishability
condition.
The indistinguishability condition can be seen as providing an epistemic basis for the standard
structurally-oriented definition of black-box testing given in the introduction. In fact, the key obser-
vation enabling our theorems on refutation and verification, given in the forthcoming sections, is that
test setups for black-box systems satisfy the indistinguishability condition.
The indistinguishability condition delimits the knowledge a tester can obtain through black-box
testing. Suppose Ted (the tester) performs a black-box analysis of a system S. Ted cannot distinguish
S from, say,⊤, simply because⊤ abstracts every system. This epistemic limitation is not alleviated by
complete tests: regardless of whether or not Ted samples and analyzes all the behaviors of S during
testing, ⊤ ∈ ⌈S⌉ is still true. Rephrasing this in terms of system behaviors, black-box testing can
neither demonstrate the absence of behaviors nor the completeness of an observation; otherwise, Ted
could tell that the system under test is not ⊤, which exhibits all behaviors, thereby distinguishing S
from ⊤. But, as just discussed, this falls outside the scope of black-box testing.
Example 5. Consider Example 4. After observing t = {(0, 0), (1, 1)}, the tester cannot conclude
that S extensionally defines the identity function. This is not surprising as S cannot be distinguished
from ⊤ by observing t alone, and ⊤ does not define the identity function. The same argument shows
that the tester cannot conclude that S is deterministic.
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Note that the indistinguishability condition holds true regardless of whether or not observations
can be carried out in a finite amount of time; we return to this point in §7. The condition is also
independent from the practical infeasibility of complete tests (that complete tests are infeasible is
demonstrated, e.g., in [31]). Moreover, whether the observations are actively triggered by providing
the system under test with selected inputs, or they are obtained by simply monitoring the system’s
behaviors is immaterial; we examine monitoring in §8.2.
We conclude this section with a remark: not all analysis techniques are constrained by the indistin-
guishability condition and some, therefore, can demonstrate the absence of behaviors. One example
is static analysis, which falls outside the scope of black-box testing as it relies on a programs source
code as opposed to inspecting a sample of the program’s behaviors [38]. Similarly, a Fagan inspec-
tion, based on structured reviews of source code and design documents, is not black-box [18]. Both of
these techniques can indeed demonstrate the absence of system behaviors. We return to the question of
how our theory can be extended with additional information, itself not discernible through black-box
testing, in §9.
5 Refutable Requirements
We formally define the notion of refutability through black-box tests and prove that any refutable
requirement is a prohibition (§5.1). Afterward, we investigate the (ir)refutability of two important
classes of requirements: semi-monotone and non-semi-monotone requirements (§5.2).
5.1 Refutability through Black-Box Tests
The purpose of testing a system with respect to a requirement is to refute the hypothesis that the
system satisfies the requirement [41, 16, 36]. This is in practice realized by finding a test case where
the system does not produce the expected output. But for which class of requirements do such test
cases exist? We characterize below the class of requirements that can be refuted using black-box tests.
We begin with an illustrative special case that relates observations, which are refinements of systems,
with requirements, which are sets of systems.
Any system model M = (D,,⊥,⊤) induces a reflexive test setup TMr = (D, ⌊·⌋), where each
observation on a system S is a system inD that refines S. WhenM is clear from the context, we simply
write Tr for M’s reflexive test setup, as we did in Example 4. In a reflexive setup, testing a system S
against a requirement R amounts to inspecting a refinement Sw of S to refute the hypothesis S ∈ R.
By merely observing Sw, with Sw ∈ ⌊S⌋, the tester cannot distinguish S from any other system that
abstracts Sw, due to the indistinguishability condition. Therefore, the tester can infer S 6∈ R after
observing Sw iff every system in ⌈Sw⌉ violates R. Hence R is refutable in a reflexive test setup if,
for any S that violates R, there is at least one witness system Sw ∈ ⌊S⌋ such that every system that
abstracts Sw violatesR. That is,R is refutable inTr if ∀S ∈ D. S 6∈ R→ ∃Sw ∈ ⌊S⌋. ⌈Sw⌉∩R = ∅.
Example 6. Consider systems whose input and output domains are the set of lists of natural num-
ber. Let R be the requirement that restricts the system’s outputs to ascending lists. Suppose that a
system S violates R. Then there must exist an input i for which S produces an output list o that is
not ascending. Let us refer to the system that exhibits just this forbidden behavior as Sw = {(i, o)}.
Clearly Sw refines S, and any system that abstracts Sw violates R by exhibiting the forbidden behav-
ior. Therefore, R is refutable in the test setup Tr.
We generalize the above and define refutability in an arbitrary test setup.
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Definition 2. Let T = (T, α) be a test setup for a system model (D,,⊥,⊤). A requirement R is
T-refutable if ∀S ∈ D. S 6∈ R→ ∃t ∈ α(S). αˆ(t) ∩R = ∅.
Let R be a (T, α)-refutable requirement. Then, for any system S, S 6∈ R→ ⌈S⌉ ∩R = ∅, simply
because α is order-preserving. The contrapositive implies that if S1 ∈ R and S2  S1, then S2 ∈ R.
That is, R is a prohibition. The following theorem is now immediate.
Theorem 1. Any T-refutable requirement is a prohibition.
We illustrate this theorem with a simple example.
Example 7. Consider the model where each system extensionally defines a binary tree where each
node is colored either red or black, and  is the subtree relation. The requirement R stipulates that
the two children of any red node must have the same color. Observing a tree t in which a red node has
a red child and a black child implies that any tree that abstracts t violates R. Therefore, R is refutable
in Tr, and it is a prohibition due to Theorem 1.
The following lemma can be seen as a basic sanity check on our definition: if requirements are
refutable, then so is their conjunction.
Lemma 3. Let ρ be a nonempty set of T-refutable requirements. Then,
∧
R∈ρR is T-refutable.
Given a system model, we say a test setup Ti is more permissive than a test setup Tj if any
Tj-refutable requirement is Ti-refutable. The following lemma along with Theorem 1 imply that, in
any system model, the reflexive test setup is the most permissive test setup.
Lemma 4. In any system model M, any prohibition is TMr -refutable.
An intuitive account of this lemma is as follows. Any test setup T = (T, α) induces a set of
obligations: O(T) = {αˆ(t) | t ∈ T}. Testing a system S in T amounts to the conclusion that S
satisfies an obligation that includes S, namely the obligation αˆ(t), where t ∈ α(S) is the observation
obtained through testing. Therefore, the smaller αˆ(t) is, the more we learn about S by observing t;
recall the indistinguishability condition. For any system S, the smallest obligation in R that includes
S is ⌈S⌉, which belongs to O(Tr) = {⌈S⌉ | S ∈ D}.
We illustrate Lemma 4 with an example from temporal requirements.
Example 8. To investigate temporal requirements, we model systems that induce infinitely long se-
quences of events, such as operating systems, and their requirements following [14]. Let Σ be an
alphabet, e.g. of events or states. We write Σω for the set of countably infinite sequences of Σ’s
elements. A behavior is an element of Σω and a system is a set of behaviors. The complete lat-
tice (2Σ
ω
,⊆, ∅,Σω) instantiates our system model, defined in §2.
A temporal property φ is a set of behaviors. By overloading the notion of satisfaction, we say
a system S satisfies φ if S ⊆ φ. That is, φ defines a refinement-closed requirement: Rφ = ⌊φ⌋.
Therefore, any property is a prohibition, hence refutable in Tr due to Lemma 4.
We return to temporal requirements in §7, where we show thatTr can be “too permissive” in some
settings, going beyond what is refutable in finite time.
As Tr is the most permissive test setup, a requirement that is irrefutable in Tr is also irrefutable
for any test setup. Obligations are prominent examples of such irrefutable requirements, as stated in
the following lemma. The proof is immediate by Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.
Lemma 5. Nontrivial obligations are irrefutable in any test setup.
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We illustrate this lemma with an example.
Example 9. In the eiomodel, the obligation O stipulates that systems must exhibit the behavior (1, 0).
Suppose Ted observes t = {(1, 1)} while testing a system S. Based on t, he cannot refute the hypothe-
sis S ∈ O, simply because ⊤ also yields t, and⊤ ∈ O. Of course interpreting O as the requirement P
stating that the system may output nothing but 0 for input 1 results in a refutable requirement. But O
and P are not equivalent: O is an obligation and P is a prohibition; recall Lemma 1.
Note that if it were known (through means outside black-box analysis) that S is deterministic, then
observing t would justify the conclusion S 6∈ O. We explicate the role of determinacy assumptions in
testing in §10.
We conclude this section with an intuitive account of (ir)refutability based on Figure 1. Recall
that the figure depicts a system S’s set of behaviors, and its obligation and prohibition, which are
both violated by S. To refute the prohibition’s satisfaction, one must locate the black circle in the
figure. This is achievable through black-box testing, which amounts to inspecting a portion of the
triangle (standing for S’s set of behaviors). To refute the obligation’s satisfaction, one must locate the
white circle, which lies outside the triangle. This is not achievable through black-box tests because
observations come only from the triangle’s interior.
Next, we turn to the irrefutability of semi-monotone requirements.
5.2 The Irrefutability of Semi-Monotone Requirements
Every requirement R is either (1) semi-monotone, or (2) not semi-monotone. In case (1), although R
is irrefutable by Theorem 1, the violation of R can be demonstrated through tests for some systems.
Recall Lemma 2: R = ⌈R⌉∧⌊R⌋ for a semi-monotone R. Any system S that violates ⌊R⌋ violates R
as well, and black-box tests can demonstrate S 6∈ ⌊R⌋.
Example 10. The non-monotone requirement R = O ∧ P , defined in Example 1, is semi-monotone.
It states that systems must extensionally define a total function. The system S = {(0, n) | n ∈ N}
violates P , which states that systems must be deterministic. Any observation that demonstrates S 6∈ P
also demonstrates S 6∈ R. Examples include the observation {(0, 1), (0, 2)} in Tr. That is, the
hypothesis S ∈ R can be refuted using tests that refute S ∈ P .
Note the contrast to system S′ = {(0, 0)}, which violates R but satisfies P . No black-box test
refutes S′ ∈ R, simply because it would have to refute S′ ∈ O, contradicting Lemma 5. Recall that O
states that systems must be total.
In case (2), where R is not semi-monotone, it is possible that testing cannot demonstrate R’s
violation for any system, as the following example illustrates.
Example 11. Consider Example 2, and the requirement R defined there: for each (i, o) ∈ S there
exists some (i′, o) ∈ S, with i 6= i′. Let (T, α) be a test setup. Any observation t ∈ T obtained
by testing any system belongs to α(⊤), and ⊤ ∈ R. That is, through black-box tests, we cannot
distinguish any system from ⊤, which indeed satisfies R. Therefore, R’s violation (for any system)
cannot be demonstrated through tests in any test setup.
To summarize, a requirement is refutable through black-box tests iff it is a prohibition. Nontrivial
obligations are irrefutable, and so are non-monotone requirements. However, the violation of a semi-
monotone requirements that is not monotone can be demonstrated through tests, but only for some
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of the systems that violate them. It is possible that the violation of the requirements that are not
semi-monotone cannot be demonstrated through black-box tests for any system.1
6 Verifiable Requirements
We define testing with the purpose of verifying the satisfaction of a requirement as dual to testing for
refutation.
Definition 3. Let T = (T, α) be a test setup for a system model (D,,⊥,⊤). A requirement R is
T-verifiable if ∀S ∈ D. S ∈ R→ ∃t ∈ α(S). αˆ(t) ⊆ R.
In particular, a requirement R is TMr -verifiable in the system model M = (D,,⊥,⊤) if ∀S ∈
D. S ∈ R → ∃Sw ∈ ⌊S⌋. ⌈Sw⌉ ⊆ R. That is, if there exists a witness system Sw that refines S
and any system that abstracts Sw satisfies R, then by observing Sw we have conclusively demon-
strated S ∈ R. The following theorem is dual to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Any T-verifiable requirement is an obligation.
An observation t ∈ α(S) proves that the system S satisfies the obligation O = αˆ(t). It also proves
that S ∈ R for any requirement R ⊇ O. Therefore, as O becomes smaller, more requirements are
proved by the observation. This explains why Tr is the most permissive test setup for verification:
anyT-verifiable requirement isTr-verifiable. Consequently, a requirement that is notTr-verifiable is
non-verifiable in any test setup. Prohibitions are prominent examples of such non-verifiable require-
ments, as the following lemma states.
Lemma 6. Nontrivial prohibitions are non-verifiable in any test setup.
It is instructive to compare this lemma and Dijkstra’s often-quoted statement [16] in the context
of black-box testing that “program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but never to
show their absence.” Dijkstra argues that programs have large, typically infinite, input domains. It is
intractable to test a program’s behavior for each input. It follows then that testing cannot prove the
absence of bugs, i.e. deviations from expected behavior. Note the contrast to Lemma 6, which holds
even if a tester could run an infinite number of tests. As discussed in §4, non-determinism poses an
epistemic limitation on what testing can achieve, regardless of the cardinality of input domains and
the number of tests we execute.
Contrary to the folklore, Lemma 6, and by extension Dijkstra’s statement, do not imply that no
requirements are verifiable through black-box tests. For instance, the requirement that obliges a magic
8-ball to output ask again later is clearly verifiable through tests: observing this output once demon-
strates the obligation’s satisfaction. We further illustrate this point with an example from temporal
requirements.
Example 12. Consider the system model of Example 8. Let e be an element of Σ. The requirement Re
consists of the systems that exhibit at least one behavior in which e appears. Note that Re is an
obligation since its satisfaction is abstraction-closed. Let S ∈ Re. Observing a refinement Sw of S
where Sw exhibits one behavior pi in which e appears demonstrates S ∈ Re: any abstraction of Sw
exhibits pi as well, hence satisfying Re. We conclude that the obligation Re is verifiable through tests
in Tr.
1The reason for “it is possible” is that a requirement that is not semi-monotone can have a semi-monotone component.
For instance, let R be a requirement that is not semi-monotone and⊤ 6∈ R. Define the prohibition P = D \ {⊤}. Note that
R ∧ P = R. Clearly⊤ 6∈ P can be demonstrated through tests, thereby refuting the hypothesis ⊤ ∈ R.
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We can now sharpen Dijkstra’s dictum to:
(D) Program testing can be used to show the presence of behaviors, but never to show
their absence, even if an infinite number of tests were allowed.
If a software bug is a prohibited behavior, then (D) extends Dijkstra’s statement, simply stipulating that
prohibitions are refutable, but not verifiable. However, if a bug is the absence of an obliged behavior,
then (D) translates to: program testing can be used to show the absence of bugs, but never to show
their presence. This sentence unrolls to: program testing can be used to show the presence of obliged
behaviors, but never to show their absence. In other words, obligations are verifiable, but not refutable.
That tests cannot show the absence of obliged behaviors has tangible implications. For example, fuzz
testing can hardly reveal omission bugs, i.e. bugs due to developers’ failure to implement a desired
feature or functionality [46].
The folklore that testing is capable of refutation, but not proving correctness, is sometimes held
by members of the software testing community and presumably reflects the wide-spread testing of
prohibitions. An example of this is the statement in [2]: “Rather than doing verification by testing,
a doubtful endeavour anyway, here we focus on falsification. It is falsification, because the tester
gains confidence in a system by designing test cases that would uncover an anticipated error. If the
falsification fails, it follows that a certain fault does not exist.” But testing is not only a refutation
technique: it is also a proof technique, as it can prove that the system under test satisfies an obligation,
such as the one given in Example 12.
7 Refutation in Finite Time
A requirement that is deemed refutable in our theory might not be refutable in practice. For exam-
ple, a requirement whose refutation hinges upon measuring the exact momentum and position of a
quantum object is impossible to refute due to the laws of physics. This limitation, not unexpectedly,
does not follow from our theory of black-box tests. Below, we extend our theory to account for a
practically relevant limitation of system testing: we consider refutation through black-box tests that
proceed in a finite amount of time. We define the notion of finite refutability (§7.1), and illustrate it
by characterizing finitely refutable temporal properties and hyper-properties (§7.2).
7.1 Finite Refutability
Intuitively, a test proceeds in a finite amount of time if observations can be carried out in finite time.
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 4. Let T = (T, α) be a test setup for a system model (D,,⊥,⊤). A requirement R is
finitely refutable in T if
(i) R is T-refutable, and
(ii) every observation in
⋃
S∈D α(S) can be carried out in finite time.
The notion of finite verifiability is defined dually.
Condition (ii) of Definition 4 refers to the world: determining whether an arbitrary observation can
be carried out in finite time falls outside our theory’s scope, and this condition’s satisfaction must be
substantiated by other means. Thus our theory cannot establish a requirement’s finite (ir)refutability
unless assumptions are made about what can be observed in finite time in the world.
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To illustrate Condition (ii), we consider a family of test setups for the eio system model; a similar
notion can be defined for other system models. The family of test setups Tk = ((N × N)k, αk),
with k ≥ 1, and αk maps system S to Sk and is inductively defined by S1 = S and Sk+1 = S × Sk.
Clearly αk is order-preserving for any k ∈ N, and testing a system S in the setup Tk amounts to
observing k input-output pairs belonging to S. We can now illustrate Condition (ii) as follows.
Example 13. Consider the eio system model, and assume that natural numbers are observable in
finite time. Then, observing any element of (N×N)k, where k ≥ 1 belongs to N, takes finite time. The
requirement Rnz stating that systems never output zero is, under this assumption, finitely refutable
in T1. Now consider the requirement Rfz , stating that systems may output zero for at most finitely
many inputs. Note that Rfz is refutable in the reflexive test setup Tr, but not finitely so, and moreover
it is not Tk-refutable for any k ≥ 1.
It now seems reasonable to conclude that Rfz is not finitely refutable: no finite set of behaviors
can refute Rfz . This conclusion does not however follow from our theory. To illustrate, consider
an alternative test setup T = ({∗,×}, α), where α(S) = {∗} if S outputs zero for finitely many
inputs, and α(S) = {∗,×} otherwise. Since α is order-preserving, T is formally a test setup. The
requirement Rfz is finitely refutable in T, under the assumption that α(S) is observable in finite
time. Whether this is a tenable assumption cannot be settled inside our theory. Although T hardly
appears realizable, such observations are possible in certain cases, for example by measuring the
electromagnetic radiation emitted from a black-box system; see, e.g., [44].
Although the satisfaction of Condition (ii) cannot be settled in our theory, this condition has
implications relevant to our theory: any test setup in which observations amount to inspecting infinite
objects cannot be used to show finite refutability. For example, it follows that only finite portions of
finitely many system behaviors can be inspected for each observation, even if those behaviors are not
themselves finite objects. We illustrate this point with an example.
Example 14. Consider the system model (2R×R,⊆, ∅,R × R), where R is the set of real numbers.
This system model is similar to the eio model except its inputs and outputs are real numbers.
Define pre(r) as the set of finite truncations of the decimal expansion of a real number r. For
instance, pre(
√
2) = {1, 1.4, 1.41, 1.414, · · · }. Note that a real number can have more than one
decimal expansions, for example, 1 and 0.999 · · · , but accounting for this point is unnecessary for
our discussion here.
We define the test setup T = (F × F, α), where F is the set of rational numbers that have a finite
decimal expansion and α maps any system S to the set
⋃
(i,o)∈S pre(i)× pre(o). An observation of a
system S in this setup is a pair (f1, f2), where f1 is a truncation of an input i and f2 is a truncation of
an output o, where (i, o) ∈ S. That is, we may observe only finite portions of the decimal expansions of
the inputs and outputs. If F’s elements are observable in finite time, then anyT-refutable requirement
is finitely refutable.
Now consider the requirement R<, stating that system outputs are strictly smaller than
√
2.
Clearly R< is a prohibition, hence Tr-refutable. Define the system S = {(1, 1.4142 · · · )}, which
outputs
√
2, decimally expanded, for the input 1. Even though S violates R<, no truncation of S’s
output’s decimal expansion conclusively demonstrates this, because the set of permissible outputs ac-
cording to R<, namely {o ∈ R | o <
√
2}, is not a closed set in R’s standard topology. That is, there
is a number, namely
√
2, that is arbitrarily close to the elements of this set, but is not a member of
the set. No finite truncation of this number’s decimal expansion can therefore conclusively determine
whether it is a member, or not. We conclude that R< is not T-refutable.
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An analogous argument shows that the requirement R≤ stating that system outputs must be less
than or equal to
√
2 isT-refutable, and hence finitely refutable, because the set of permissible outputs
it induces, namely (−∞,√2], is topologically closed.
The example hints at a fundamental connection between refutability and topological closure when
system behaviors are infinite sequences. This connection was investigated by Alpern and Schneider
in the context of temporal properties [4], which we turn to next.
7.2 Finitely Refutable Temporal Requirements
In this section, we characterize finitely refutable temporal requirements. We start by extending the
system model (2Σ
ω
,⊆, ∅,Σω), associated with temporal requirements (defined in Example 8), with
some additional temporal notions.
Let Σ∗ be the set of all finite sequences of Σ’s elements. For a behavior pi ∈ Σω, we write pre(pi)
for the set of all finite prefixes of pi, and define the test setup T∗ as (T∗, α∗), where T∗ is the set
of all finite subsets of Σ∗, and α∗(S) is the set of all finite subsets of
⋃
pi∈S pre(pi) for a system S.
Intuitively, any element of α∗(S) is a possible observation of S, where finite prefixes of finitely many
behaviors of S are inspected. For anyT∗-refutable requirement R and any S 6∈ R, there exists a finite
(witness) set tw of finite prefixes of S’s behaviors such that any system S
′ that could have yielded
the observation tw, i.e. tw ∈ α∗(S′), violates R. Clearly, any T∗-refutable requirement is finitely
refutable, if elements of Σ can be observed in finite time. Next, we relate T∗-refutability and T∗-
verifiability to the notions of temporal properties and hyper-properties.
A temporal property is a set of permissible behaviors [40, 4], i.e. a subset of Σω. Any property φ
defines a prohibition, namely the refinement-closed requirement Rφ = ⌊φ⌋ (recall Example 8). We
illustrate this with an example.
Example 15. Recall the requirement Re from Example 12, consisting of the systems that exhibit at
least one behavior where e appears. Since properties are prohibitions, this obligation is not a property
as otherwise Re would have to be trivial by Lemma 1.
As a side note, that Re is not a property shows that Re cannot be expressed as a formula in
the linear-time temporal logic (LTL), whose formulas define properties [40]. Since Re is expressed
as EF e in the computation tree logic CTL, we can conclude the well-known result that LTL is not
more expressive than CTL; for an introduction to CTL and its expressiveness see [17].
We now turn to safety and liveness property types. We denote the concatenation of an element
of Σ∗ with one of Σω by their juxtaposition. A property φ is safety if ∀pi 6∈ φ.∃σ ∈ pre(pi).∀pi′ ∈
Σω. σpi′ 6∈ φ and liveness if ∀σ ∈ Σ∗.∃pi ∈ Σω. σpi ∈ φ. That is, safety and liveness properties are
closed and dense sets, respectively [4]. The following lemma, whose proof hinges upon Lemma 1 and
Theorem 1, implies that nontrivial liveness properties, although Tr-refutable, are not T∗-refutable;
cf. [4].
Lemma 7. A temporal property φ is T∗-refutable iff φ is safety. Moreover, all temporal properties
are Tr-refutable and any T∗-verifiable property is trivial.
Any property φ is the conjunction of a safety property φs and a liveness property φl [4]. Therefore,
if a system S violates φs, then the hypothesis S ∈ φ can be refuted through tests aimed at refuting
S ∈ φs. However, if S violates only the liveness conjunct of φ, namely S ∈ φs and S 6∈ φl, then the
hypothesis S ∈ φ cannot be (finitely) refuted in T∗, due to Lemma 7. This is akin to the refutability
of semi-monotone requirements for some systems, discussed in §5. See also [49, 19].
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We now turn to hyper-properties. A hyper-property is a set of properties [14], i.e. a requirement
in our model. A system S satisfies a hyper-property H, if S ∈ H. In our setting, a hyper-property H is
hyper-safety [14] if for any S 6∈ H, there exists an observation t ∈ α(S) such that ∀S′ ∈ αˆ(t). S′ 6∈
H; It is easy to check that a temporal requirement R is hyper-safety iff R is T∗-refutable. Now it
is immediate by Theorem 1 that any hyper-safety requirement is a prohibition. Therefore, finitely
verifiable hyper-safety requirements must be trivial. For instance, Example 12’s requirement Re,
which is clearly finitely verifiable inT∗, cannot be hyper-safety and it is therefore not finitely refutable
in T∗. These results show how existing, specialized concepts and their refutability follow as special
cases of the notions we defined. We revisit properties and hyper-properties in §8.2.
In light of this discussion, one can see the test setup Tk, defined in §7.1, as the setup where a
single observation is carried out over k copies of the system under test. As a side remark, we note that
for each k there is a requirement that is Tk+1-refutable but not Tk-refutable. That is, self-composing
a system k times, namely observing k system behaviors, is not sufficient for demonstrating that the
system violates the requirement. For example, sampling a curve three times is not sufficient for
refuting the requirement stating that the curve is a circle: there is a circle that passes any three points
on the plane. Sampling the curve four times could however refute this particular requirement.
8 Refutability through Algorithmic Means
A test oracle for a requirement R is a (partial) decision function that given an observation on a
system decides whether the system violates R. Our definition of finitely refutable requirements poses
no constraints on their test oracles. In particular, whether an observation demonstrates a violation of a
finitely refutable requirement need not be decidable. Such “undecidable” requirements are uncommon
in testing practice. However, we show that explicating the computational constraints of refutation not
only clarifies the limits of algorithmic testing (§8.1), it also sheds light on the relationship between
refutation through testing and enforcement through monitoring (§8.2).
8.1 Algorithmic Refutability
We start with two auxiliary definitions, and assume that the reader is familiar with basic computability
theory. For an introduction to this topic see, e.g., [43].
Given a countable set U , a setE ⊆ U is recursively enumerable if there is a (semi-)algorithm AE
that terminates and outputs true for any input u ∈ U that is a member of E. If u 6∈ E, then AE does
not terminate.
Any requirement R induces a set ΩR of irremediable observations {t ∈ T | αˆ(t) ∩ R = ∅}
in a test setup T = (T, α). It follows that a system S violates a T-refutable R iff α(S) ∩ ΩR 6= ∅.
Intuitively, a requirement is algorithmically refutable if it induces a recursively enumerable set of
irremediable observations. This is because if a system S violates such a requirement R in T, then
there is at least one observation t ∈ α(S) that can be made in finite time, where AΩR terminates on t
and outputs true. Here, truemeans t ∈ ΩR, demonstrating S 6∈ R. Observing such a t through testing,
therefore, conclusively refutes the hypothesis S ∈ R.
Definition 5. Let T = (T, α) be a test setup for a system model (D,,⊥,⊤). A requirement R is
algorithmically refutable in T if R is finitely refutable in T, and ΩR is a recursively enumerable
subset of the countable set T .
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Note that, from the standpoint of refutation, nothing is gained by requiring the set ΩR to be recur-
sive since determining that an element is not an irremediable observations does not contribute to the
requirement’s refutation. It is therefore not necessary to determine non-membership.
The following example illustrates Definition 5.
Example 16. In eio, the prohibition P states that a system may never output 0 for an odd input.
Clearly, P is T1-refutable, and its set of irremediable observations ΩP = {{(2i + 1, 0)} ∈ T1 | i ∈
N} is recursive. If natural numbers are observable in finite time, then P is algorithmically refutable
in T1: any S that violates P induces an observation, for example t = {(3, 0)}, where a Turing
machine arrives at the verdict t ∈ ΩP in finite time.
Let R be an algorithmically refutable requirement in T = (T, α), and S be a system where α(S)
is a recursively enumerable subset of T . Note that, as previously discussed, black-box testing cannot
establish the absence of behaviors in the system under test S. Therefore, it is crucial that α(S) is
recursively enumerable, but not, say, co-recursively enumerable or recursive: these would imply that
the tester could “see” absent behaviors. The decision problem that asks whether S violates R is
semi-decidable, as the following test algorithm illustrates.
Algorithm 1 (Test Algorithm). Fix an arbitrary total order on T ’s elements. Dovetail Aα(S)’s com-
putations on the elements of T .2 In parallel, dovetail AΩR’s computations on those observations for
which Aα(S) terminates. Output true and terminate, when a computation of AΩR terminates.
The algorithm checks whether the intersection of two recursively enumerable sets, namely α(S)
and ΩR, is empty. If S 6∈ R, then there exists at least one observation tw in the set α(S) ∩ ΩR. The
test algorithm is bound to terminate on tw and output true, thus demonstrating S 6∈ R in finite time.
However, if S ∈ R, then the test (semi-)algorithm does not terminate.
Algorithm 1 achieves the (impractical) ideal of testing: it not only has “a high probability of de-
tecting an as yet undiscovered error” [36], the algorithm is in fact guaranteed to reveal flaws in any
system that violates a requirement, if the preconditions are met. In this sense, Algorithm 1 demon-
strates the limits of algorithmic testing. We remark that although this algorithm is not a recipe for
testing practice, there are similarities. For instance, standard test selection methods place likely wit-
nesses of R’s violation early in the ordering assumed on T [36]. This would speed up Algorithm 1
too.
We illustrate Algorithm 1 with an example.
Example 17. LetM be a Turing machine that is available to us as a black-box: we may provide M
with an input i and observe halt ifM halts on i. IfM diverges on i, then we observe no outputs.
In the eio model, the requirement R is defined as: S ∈ R if for any (i, 1) ∈ S the machine M
diverges on the input i. It is easy to check that R is T1-refutable, with T1 = (T1, α1), and the set ΩR
is recursively enumerable: given an observation {(i, 1)} in T1, if {(i, 1)} ∈ ΩR, then M is bound to
halt on i.
2Dovetailing, which is a primitive parallelization technique, proceeds in stages. Given an ordered list of inputs
x0, x1, · · · , one step of computation is performed on x0 in stage 1. In stage n + 1, we perform n + 1 steps of the
computations for x0, · · · , xn. In contrast to performing the computations on x0, and then on x1, and so forth, the bene-
fit of dovetailing is the following: suppose the computation for x0 never terminates, whereas it terminates for x1. Then,
dovetailing’s parallelization ensures that in a finite amount of time the result of the computation on x1 becomes available.
As a side note, dovetailing a system S’s executions is not hindered by S being a black-box. To perform dovetailing,
a tester merely needs a mechanism for controlling the progress of S’s computations. For example, when S is given as a
computer program, dovetailing can be achieved by controlling the CPU cycles allocated to S’s computations, which does
not require inspecting the program’s source code.
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Suppose that α1(S) is recursively enumerable for a system S. That is, Aα(S) is guaranteed to
terminate on any (i, o) ∈ S. If S 6∈ R, then there is a witness (w, 1) ∈ S whereM terminates on w.
Therefore, dovetailing M ’s computations on i for all (i, 1) on which Aα(S) terminates is bound to
exhibit a terminating computation, thus demonstrating S 6∈ R in finite time.
Now consider the requirement U stating that a system may contain (i, 1) only if M halts on i.
Clearly U is T1-refutable. However, ΩU = {{(i, 1)} | i ∈ N,M diverges on i} is not recursively
enumerable: M produces no outputs for such an input i. This shows that U cannot be algorithmically
refuted in T1.
Next we apply the notion of algorithmic refutability to establish a duality between refutation and
enforcement in the context of temporal requirements.
8.2 Refutation versus Enforcement
It is easy to check that a safety property φ is algorithmically refutable in T∗ iff φ’s set of irreme-
diable sequences ∇φ = {σ ∈ Σ∗ | ∀pi ∈ Σω. σpi 6∈ φ} is recursively enumerable. This condition
separates refutability from enforceability, as explained below. To enforce the safety property φ on
a system S, a reference monitor observes some t ∈ α(S). If t demonstrates that S violates φ, then
the monitor stops S. Otherwise, the monitor permits S to continue its execution. For enforcement,
the set ∇φ must therefore be recursive [24]. It then follows that any enforceable temporal property
is algorithmically refutable. In contrast, any property φ, where ∇φ is recursively enumerable but not
recursive, is algorithmically refutable, but not enforceable.
To further illustrate the relationship between refutability and enforceability, we define weak en-
forceability for a hyper-safety requirement R as follows. By monitoring the executions of a system S,
a monitor observes some t ∈ α∗(S). If t does not conclusively demonstrate S 6∈ R, then the monitor
permits S to continue. However, if t does conclusively demonstrate R’s violation, then the monitor
may either stop S, or diverge and thereby stall S. Recall that a system S violates a hyper-safety re-
quirement R iff α∗(S) ∩ ΩR 6= ∅. To weakly enforce R, the set ΩR must therefore be co-recursively
enumerable, i.e. T∗ \ ΩR must be recursively enumerable. This observation, which concurs with [37,
Theorem 4.2], illustrates that weak enforceability and algorithmic refutability are complementary in
the sense that the former requires ΩR to be co-recursively enumerable and the latter requires ΩR to
be recursively enumerable. This duality between refutability and enforceability becomes evident only
after explicating the computational constraints of testing and enforcement.
9 Refutability under Auxiliary Assumptions
Testers might have partial information about a black-box system. For example, they might have
knowledge that an otherwise black-box system is deterministic. In this section we explore how black-
box testing can be augmented with such information. Strictly speaking, this topic falls outside the
black-box setting of §2, where the domainD contains at least one non-determinism system, namely⊤.
Testing under auxiliary assumptions can in fact be seen as a form of gray-box testing, where testers
know, through means outside of black-box analysis, that a system’s internal operations are in some
way constrained.
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9.1 Generalized Refutability
We start by generalizing the definition of refutability to refutability under auxiliary assumptions since
a tester’s partial information about the system under test can be modeled as assumptions. We define
an assumption as a set of systems. An assumption A is valid for a system S, or S satisfies A, if S is
included in A. Clearly assumptions and requirements have the same type in our model. However, in
contrast to requirements, assumptions are in general not subjected to analysis.
An assumption A about the system under test S can alleviate a tester’s epistemic limitation (rooted
in the indistinguishability condition). Namely, if S is assumed to satisfy A, then from an observation
t the tester can conclude that S belongs to a subset of αˆ(t), namely the subset that consists of the
systems that satisfy A. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 6. Let (D,,⊥,⊤) be a system model, T = (T, α) a test setup, and A an assumption. A
requirement R is T-refutable under A if ∀S ∈ A. S 6∈ R → ∃t ∈ α(S). (αˆ(t) ∩A) ∩R = ∅.
Note that letting A = D in Definition 6 results in Definition 2. That is, refutability is a special
case of refutability under assumptions where no assumptions are made about systems. We illustrate
Definition 6 with an example.
Example 18. Consider Example 9, where the obligation O consists of the systems that exhibit the
behavior (1, 0). We define the assumption A as the set of total, deterministic systems, to reflect the
information that the system under test is known to be total and deterministic.
The obligation O is T1-refutable under A, simply because any system that satisfies A and vio-
lates O must exhibit a behavior (1, i + 1), with i ∈ N, due to totality. Observing such a behavior
demonstrates that the system does not exhibit (1, 0), due to determinacy. Therefore the system violates
O.
Clearly the above argument falls apart without the determinacy assumption. To see why A’s
totality conjunct is also necessary for the argument, consider the deterministic system S = {(0, 0)},
which violates O as well as the totality conjunct of A. No observation in α1(S) can demonstrate
S 6∈ O.
Example 18 shows that irrefutable requirements can be refuted if the system under test is known
to satisfy certain assumptions. This is because an assumption A reduces the set of the systems that
could have yielded a given observation. The smallerA is, the weaker the indistinguishability condition
becomes. Note however that the set of test subjects shrinks along withA: refutability under A pertains
only to the systems in A.
The process of adding assumptions to obtain refutability does not undermine Theorem 1’s state-
ment that prohibitions are the only requirements that can be refuted through tests. Theorem 1 is a
special case of the following theorem where A = D: that any refutable requirement is a prohibition
pertains to the special case where no assumptions are made about systems.
Theorem 3. Let T = (T, α) be a test setup, and A an assumption. If a requirement R is T-refutable
under A, then there exists a prohibition PR|A such that ∀S ∈ A. S 6∈ PR|A ↔ S 6∈ R. Namely,
PR|A = ⌊A ∩R⌋.
This theorem implies that the task of refuting an (irrefutable) R under A can be reduced to the task of
refuting the prohibition PR|A.
The following example illustrates Theorem 3.
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Example 19. Consider Example 18. Note thatA∩O consists of deterministic total systems that exhibit
the behavior (1, 0). We define P as the requirement that forbids exhibiting any behavior (1, i + 1),
with i ∈ N. Roughly speaking, P is found by adding the closed-world assumption [42] to O: the
outputs not obliged by O are prohibited by P . Below, we show P is equal to PO|A, when confining
our attention to the systems that satisfy A.
If a deterministic total system S belongs to PO|A, then S belongs to O due to Theorem 3. That
is, (1, 0) ∈ S. Then, due to S’s determinacy, no behavior (1, i + 1), with i ∈ N, can belong to S.
Therefore, S ∈ P .
If a deterministic total system S belongs to P , then, due to its totality and determinacy, S must
exhibit (1, 0). Therefore, S ∈ O, and hence S ∈ A∩O. This entails S ∈ ⌊A ∩O⌋. That is, S ∈ PO|A.
That P = PO|A further justifies the definition of PR|A, given in Theorem 3: PO|A is indeed the
prohibition we try to refute when refuting O under A.
9.2 Scope and Applications
We discuss here the scope and possible applications of Theorem 3. First, Theorem 3 implies that as-
sumptions can undermine the separation of obligations and prohibitions that was presented in Lemma 1.
This is because, under assumptions, obligations can be replaced with prohibitions and vice versa. But
this is not surprising when a system’s set of behaviors is known to be limited (assumptions can reflect
such limitations). For example, the obligation to turn right at a crossroad prohibits turning left.
Second, the previous examples show that it is possible to refute non-prohibitions under assump-
tions, such as totality and determinacy. Such assumptions cannot be substantiated by testing, but may
be established using white-box techniques that analyze a system’s internal wiring or its source code.
Third, it is possible to refute some non-prohibitions for some systems using purely black-box
analysis. Namely, we can use Theorem 3 to reduce the testing of an irrefutable requirement R to a
black-box refutation and a black-box verification. For our reduction, Ted (the tester) first formulates
an assumption A based on possibly unreliable information he has about the system under test S.
Afterward, Ted tries to refute the hypothesis S ∈ PR|A. If this succeeds, then he has shown S 6∈ R, if
S ∈ A. In case A is verifiable through tests, Ted tries to verify S ∈ A. If this succeeds as well, then
he has an unconditional proof of S 6∈ R. We illustrate this reduction with an example.
Example 20. In eio, consider the requirement R stating that if a system exhibits the behavior (1, 0)
then it should not output 0 for any other odd input. Otherwise, it must output 0 for infinitely many
inputs.
Clearly R is not a prohibition, hence it is irrefutable. We assume the system under test S outputs
0 for input 1, and formulate the assumption A as the set of systems that exhibit (1, 0). The prohibition
PR|A then consists of the systems that do not exhibit 0 for any odd input larger than 1. We refute
S ∈ PR|A by observing, say, {(3, 0)} in the test setup T1. Again in T1, we verify that S exhibits
(1, 0). If these steps succeed, we obtain S ∈ A and S 6∈ PR|A. These together entail S 6∈ R, due to
Theorem 3.
Note that, in accordance to the results of §5.2, testing can refute R’s satisfaction only for some
systems that violate R.
Investigating practical applications of combining black-box refutation with black-box verification,
following the above reduction, remains as future work. In §10, we present other applications of
refutability under auxiliary assumptions.
Fourth, dual to Theorem 3, assumptions can also facilitate verification through black-box testing.
For instance, regularity and uniformity assumptions enable testers to execute a limited number of tests
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and generalize their findings to a large section of, or even the entire, input domain [20, 26]. These
assumptions enable testers to conclude that a system satisfies a requirement by observing the system’s
behaviors for a limited set of inputs.
We conclude this section with a side remark. We have previously explored the importance of
determinacy assumptions, but obviously determinacy cannot be assumed for systems that are known
to be non-deterministic. Weaker assumptions are needed for such systems. For example, the complete
test assumption states that there exists a number n where if a test is executed n times, then all non-
deterministic system behaviors are observed for that particular test; see, for instance, [13, 25]. This
assumption can be justified if there is a fairness constraint on non-determinism, meaning that the
system exercises all available non-deterministic internal choices in a fair manner, e.g. by tossing a fair
coin. The complete test assumption enables testers to, in effect, treat a non-deterministic system as a
deterministic one by repeated testing.
10 Testing Practice Revisited
Below, we review three prominent testing techniques, namely functional testing, model-based testing,
and white-box fuzz testing, and examine them in light of our theory. This review serves two purposes.
First, it demarcates the scope and reach of our theory. Second, it illustrates the theory’s applications.
For example, we explicate the implicit assumptions upon which functional testing is typically based.
Black-box Functional Testing. Functional testing refers to testing functional requirements. A re-
quirement is deemed functional if it prescribes a system’s desired functionality or features. For exam-
ple, a functional requirement states that systems must have a feature where by entering a client’s iden-
tification number, a system user obtains the client’s phone number. Functional requirements generally
correspond to obligations, which are irrefutable. 3 Yet, functional testing is common practice [39, 36].
This seeming discrepancy can be resolved by noticing that the practice of functional testing is based
upon (implicit) auxiliary assumptions, as the following example illustrates.
Example 21. Consider the eio model. The functional requirements R obliges systems to output pc
for input c, where c is a client identification number, and pc is the client c’s phone number. Testing
R in practice amounts to providing the system under test S with the input c. If S’s output differs
from pc (crash is one such output), then the tester concludes that S violates R. This conclusion is
justified under the assumption that S is deterministic: only then observing any behavior other than
(c, pc) demonstrates S 6∈ R. To make R refutable, the totality assumption is also needed here; recall
Example 18.
As the example suggests, assuming that the system under test is deterministic facilitates refuting
functional requirements. The determinacy assumption is in fact implicit in much of testing practice.
For example, if a program passes the test that checks the output when the input is the empty list, then
most test engineers would take this as a proof that the program behaves correctly on empty lists. This
reasoning hinges upon the assumption that the program is deterministic, which may or may not be
justified in the case at hand.
3Here, we focus our attention on those requirements that oblige a certain system functionality or feature. Functional
requirements that are not obligations, e.g. exception-freeness, are exempt from our discussion. We remark that there is no
canonical definition of functional, as opposed to non-functional, requirements in the literature [21].
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We can now say that functional requirements are in practice refuted under the implicit assumption
of determinacy. That is, functional requirements are taken to forbid all outputs other than those pre-
scribed for a given input. For instance, in Example 21, for the input c, any output different from pc is
forbidden. However, not all obligations admit this interpretation, as the following example illustrates.
Example 22. Consider a coffee vending machine V , and a slot machine S. Suppose that V is required
to output a cup of coffee and S is required to output a winning combination, after inserting a coin.
Both these requirements are obligations. We expect a coffee machine to be deterministic, and therefore
(implicitly) add to its obligation the following requirement: V may exhibit no behavior other than
outputting coffee. This is a prohibition and can in fact be refuted. A slot machine, in contrast, is
non-deterministic. It would be absurd to forbid S from exhibiting non-winning combinations. Hence,
the hypothesis that S satisfies its requirement remains irrefutable through tests.
The success of day-to-day functional testing indicates that assuming determinacy is by and large
justified in practice. Without explicating such implicit assumptions, however, their existence and
role remain obscure. Moreover, only after explicating the determinacy assumption can we see that
functional tests that rely upon determinacy rely upon an assumption that cannot be discharged through
black-box analysis alone (determinacy, being a prohibition, cannot be verified through black-box
tests). Therefore, either more powerful techniques, such as white-box analysis, should be employed
for justifying determinacy, or test results should be presented along with the untested assumption.
We conclude this discussion by remarking that categorically assuming that testing only applies
to deterministic systems is unjustified: it excludes concurrent systems and those that interact with an
environment containing humans, quantum sensors, and hardware prone to stochastic failures. More-
over, substantiating determinacy assumptions is a formidable challenge in practice. For example,
checking a concurrent system’s determinacy, even when the system’s source code is available, is hard;
see, e.g., [10]. This is because concurrent systems behave differently in the presence of different
schedulers. Even if the system is amenable to white-box analysis, the scheduler is typically either
unavailable to testers or it is a “black-box”. This substantially increases the complexity of finding vio-
lations of requirements such as determinacy, atomicity, and deadlock-freeness in concurrent systems.
Indeed, several existing test methods for concurrent systems rely on instrumenting the system or the
scheduler to tame non-deterministic behaviors [12, 35, 5].
Model-based Testing. In model-based testing, a system’s obligations (and in some cases its prohi-
bitions) are represented as an ideal model, for example by an extended state machine [50]. Refuting
the hypothesis that the system exhibits all the desired behaviors, specified by the model, amounts to
identifying a behavior in the model that is not exhibited by the system. This conforms to the lower-
bound interpretation of obligations: to find the white circle in Figure 1, one can explore the oval,
which represents all the obligatory behaviors, and check if the system lacks any of them. This is the
central idea of model-based tests [48, 50].
The above account of model-based testing runs into a discrepancy similar to the one raised by
black-box functional testing: the tester is provided with an ideal model for the system under test, but
has no reasons to believe that the system does not exhibit more behaviors than those observed during
testing. The resolution again lies in explicating auxiliary assumptions. We illustrate this point with an
example.
Example 23. This example is based on the test method described in [50, Chapter 5]. Suppose the
desired behaviors for a system S are given as a deterministic finite-state Mealy machine. At each
state, the machine specifies the desired system output for any input. It also specifies the system’s next
22
state, but we ignore that part here. Suppose that the system’s input domain is I , and it is required
to output some oi for input i, with i ∈ I , at a certain state. This requirement, which we call R, is
often implicitly interpreted as a semi-monotone requirement O ∧ P , where O obliges S to output oi
for input i, and P prohibits S from outputting any o′ 6= oi for input i at that particular state.
Note that refuting S ∈ R, under the assumption that S is deterministic and total, is logically
equivalent to refuting S ∈ P : if S violates P , then it immediately violates R. Conversely, if S
violates R because S 6∈ O, then S violates P as well due to its determinacy and totality. A tester can
therefore focus on P , which is indeed refutable through tests; recall Theorem 3.
The above reasoning is the basis of the test method prescribed in [50]: choose an execution of the
Mealy machine. If the system produces an input-output sequence different from the one prescribed by
the machine, then it violates its specified requirement. Conversely, if the system violates the require-
ment, then it is bound to deviate from the Mealy machine in at least one execution.
The example explicates the auxiliary assumptions that are necessary for meaningful model-based
testing in practice. Such assumptions are given elsewhere in the literature in different contexts, see
for example [7, 26, 48, 50].
White-box Fuzz Testing. As illustrated in previous sections, black-box tests cannot establish the
absence of behaviors. This limitations applies to white-box fuzz testing if the program source code
is used only for generating test inputs, as opposed to inferring the absence of behaviors. Namely,
after observing a set of behaviors, whose generation has been guided by the source code, the tester
is not justified in concluding that the program exhibits no other behaviors. See, e.g., [11, 22]. An
analogous argument shows that unit testing, as in JUnit [30], cannot establish the absence of behaviors
if the source code, although accessible to testers, is not inspected for demonstrating the absence of
behaviors.
Fuzz testing is typically concerned with refuting generic prohibitions, such as the system does
not access unallocated memory for any input [46]. To refute such requirements, a white-box fuzzing
tool covers as exhaustively as possible the program code of the system under test [11, 22]. This
conforms to the upper-bound interpretation of prohibitions: to refute a prohibition, one looks for a
system behavior that is forbidden by the prohibition. Returning to Figure 1, one explores the triangle
(which represents the set of system behaviors) to find the black circle where the triangle intersects
with the hatched area (forbidden behaviors).
The above line of reasoning also sheds light on the suitability of the approximation techniques that
are common in (white-box) static program analysis. For example, a may summary over-approximates
a program’s set of behaviors [38]. If this does not contain a set of obligatory behaviors, then the
program violates the corresponding obligation. Similarly, a must summary under-approximates a pro-
gram’s set of behaviors [38]. If this intersects a set of prohibited behaviors, then the program violates
the corresponding prohibition. Note that none of these approximations is immediately applicable to
refuting requirements that are not semi-monotone because such requirements do not admit the lower-
bound and upper-bound interpretations, as discussed in §3.
11 Related Work
Testing is a broad domain. We group the most closely related work into three areas, which we present
below. This complements the related work discussed in previous sections.
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Refutability and Verifiability. Our definition of refutability is inspired by Popper’s notion of testable
theories [41]. Theories of black-box testing proposed in the software engineering literature are largely
concerned with the notions of test selection, test adequacy, and exhaustiveness; see, e.g., [23, 53, 20,
48, 3]. Refutable requirements have not been investigated in prior work, except for temporal properties
and hyper-properties, which we discussed in §7.2 and §8.2.
Tests for verifying the correctness of programs have been studied in the literature; see, for exam-
ple, [28, 9, 54]. The correctness guarantees that such tests provide are inherently different from the
verifiability of obligations (§6), as they are reliable guarantees only when programs and their faults
satisfy assumptions that cannot be justified solely through black-box analysis.
Finally, tests for obtaining probabilistic correctness guarantees, investigated for example in [6],
fall outside the scope of this paper.
Obligations and Prohibitions. Obligations and prohibitions, as requirement types, implicitly ap-
pear in various domains of software engineering. For example, Damm and Harel introduce existential
charts for specifying the obligatory behaviors of a system, and universal charts for specifying all the
behaviors the system exhibits [15]. An existential chart intuitively corresponds to an obligation, and
a universal chart corresponds to a semi-monotone requirement in our theory, which is the conjunction
of an obligation and a prohibition. The notions of necessity and possibility also have a central role in
modal logic. For example, Larsen and Thomsen’s modal transition systems specify obligations and
prohibitions through, respectively, must and may transitions [32]. Similarly, Tretmans’ testing the-
ory [48] is based on specifications that define both a lower-bound and an upper-bound on a system’s
behaviors, which roughly speaking correspond to, respectively, obligations and prohibitions. These
works define prohibitions and obligations in concrete modeling formalisms. In contrast, we present
abstract definitions that can be instantiated by the existing ones.
Finally, security requirements are sometimes called negative [33] and universal [8] because they
do not endow a system with features and functions; rather, they define the system’s permitted behav-
iors. They are simply prohibitions.
Testability. The notion of testability is widely used in software engineering. The IEEE glossary
of software engineering terminology [29] defines testability as: “(1) The degree to which a system
or component facilitates the establishment of test criteria and the performance of tests to determine
whether those criteria have been met. (2) The degree to which a requirement is stated in terms that
permit establishment of test criteria and performance of tests to determine whether those criteria
have been met”. Condition (1) qualifies systems, and condition (2) requirements. Our definition of
refutability applies to condition (2). An instance of irrefutability due to failure to meet condition (1)
is a system with unobservable error states. Such considerations fall outside the scope of our theory,
which is built around observations.
12 Concluding Remarks
We have formalized a simple abstract model of systems and requirements, upon which we have built a
theory of testing. Our theory is centered around elementary notions, such as satisfiability, refinement,
and observations, and it allows us to reason precisely about the limits and methods of black-box
testing. We have used it to fully characterize the classes of refutable and verifiable requirements for
black-box tests. We have also clarified testing folklore and practice. For example, we have shown that
non-exhaustive testing can be used to verify obligations. And methodologically it becomes clear that
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functional requirements can be tested only based on assumptions that are not themselves verifiable
through black-box tests.
Our focus has been on black-box testing, defined in a general way that encompasses different
concrete testing techniques, and its extension to certain types of gray-box analysis. Naturally black-
box tests can be combined with other analysis techniques, like static analysis. The indistinguishability
condition of §4, stating that the system under test can be any abstraction of an observation obtained
through tests, would then no longer be applicable. For instance, if the system under test is known to be
deterministic, then clearly more requirements become refutable, as discussed in §9. It is not surprising
that augmenting black-box analysis with knowledge that itself cannot be verified through black-box
tests expands the analysis’s capabilities. This paves the way for more powerful refutation methods
capable of refuting more requirements. Developing such an extension of our theory, and exploring its
applications remain as future work.
We remark that our theory of black-box tests is not readily applicable to probabilistic constraints.
For example, a gambling regulation requiring that slot machines have a 95% payout cannot be refuted
through black-box test. Nevertheless, tests refuting such probabilistic constraints with a controllable
margin of error can be devised. Developing a corresponding theory of tests and refutation also remains
as future work.
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A Proofs
We present the proofs of the lemmas and theorems given in the paper.
Lemma 1. If no system satisfies R, then R is trivial. If some system S satisfies R, then every system
in ⌊⌈S⌉⌋ satisfies R because R is an obligation and a prohibition. As ⌊⌈S⌉⌋ = D, for any S ∈ D, we
conclude that every system satisfies R. That is, R is trivial.
Lemma 2. We split the proof of the “iff” claim into two parts.
(1) Assume R is semi-monotone. We show that R = ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋. Clearly R ⊆ ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋,
for any requirement R. All we need to prove then is that ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋ ⊆ R. If ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋ = ∅,
then the claim trivially holds. Suppose S ∈ ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋ for some system S. From S ∈ ⌈R⌉, we
conclude ∃S− ∈ R. S−  S. Similarly, from S ∈ ⌊R⌋, we conclude ∃S+ ∈ R. S  S+. In short,
we have
S− ∈ R, S+ ∈ R, and S−  S  S+ . (†)
Now, since R is semi-monotone, one of the following three statements holds: (a) R is the con-
junction of two obligations, (b) R is the conjunction of two prohibitions, or (c) R is the conjunction of
an obligation O and a prohibition P . Case (a) along with Statement (†) imply S ∈ R. The same holds
for case (b). We now consider case (c): from S− ∈ R and S−  S of Statement (†), we conclude
S− ∈ O, and hence S ∈ O. Similarly, from S+ ∈ R and S  S+ of Statement (†), we conclude
S+ ∈ P , and hence S ∈ P . Finally, S ∈ O, S ∈ P , and R = O ∧ P imply S ∈ R. Therefore, if R is
semi-monotone, then R = ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋.
(2) Now, assume R = ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋. We show that R is semi-monotone. Note that for any require-
ment R, ⌈R⌉ is an obligation, hence monotone. Moreover, ⌊R⌋ is a prohibition, hence monotone.
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Therefore, ⌈R⌉ ∧ ⌊R⌋ is semi-monotone, that is the intersection of two monotone requirements, for
any requirement R. This completes the proof.
As a side note: an argument similar to (1) above shows that
∧
R∈ρR is semi-monotone for any
nonempty set ρ of semi-monotone requirements.
Theorem 1. Suppose R is T-refutable, with T = (T, α). We prove that R is a prohibition. If R is
empty, then R is a trivial prohibition. If R is nonempty, then let S ∈ R. Now, suppose S′  S. All
we need to prove is that S′ ∈ R, which we prove by contradiction.
Assume S′ 6∈ R. Then ∃t ∈ T. αˆ(t) ∩ R = ∅ simply because R is T-refutable. Since α is
order-preserving and S′  S, we have t ∈ α(S). Therefore, S ∈ αˆ(t). This entails S 6∈ R, which
contradicts the assumption S ∈ R. We conclude that S′ ∈ R. Therefore, R is a prohibition.
Lemma 3. Let T = (T, α), and writeW for
∧
R∈ρR. Suppose a system S violates W . Then there is
at least one R ∈ ρ such that S 6∈ R. SinceR isT-refutable, there is an observation t ∈ α(S) such that
αˆ(t) ∩R = ∅. Now, fromW ⊆ R we obtain αˆ(t) ∩W = ∅. This shows thatW is T-refutable.
Lemma 4. Fix a system model M = (D,,⊥,⊤), and let R be a prohibition. We show that R
is TMr -refutable, where T
M
r = (D, ⌊·⌋).
Assume that some system S violates R. Since R is a prohibition, any system that abstracts S
violates R. Moreover, S ∈ ⌊S⌋. We conclude that ∃Sw ∈ ⌊S⌋. ⌈Sw⌉ ∩ R = ∅, namely Sw = S.
Hence R is TMr -refutable.
Lemma 5. Suppose R is a nontrivial obligation. We prove by contradiction that R is not refutable in
any test setup.
Assume that R is T-refutable in some test setup T. By Theorem 1, R is a prohibition. Then, R
must be trivial by Lemma 1, because R is both a prohibition and an obligation. That R is trivial
contradicts the assumption that R is a nontrivial obligation. Hence R is not refutable in any test
setup.
Theorem 2. Suppose R is T-verifiable, with T = (T, α). We prove that R is an obligation. If R is
empty, then R is a trivial obligation. If R is nonempty, then let S ∈ R. Now, suppose S  S′. All we
need to prove is that S′ ∈ R. SinceR isT-verifiable, from S ∈ Rwe conclude ∃t ∈ α(S). αˆ(S) ⊆ R.
As α is order-preserving and S  S′, we have t ∈ α(S′). That is, S′ ∈ αˆ(S). We conclude
that S′ ∈ R. Therefore, R is an obligation.
Lemma 6. Suppose R is a nontrivial prohibition. We prove by contradiction that R is not verifiable in
any test setup.
Assume that R is T-verifiable in some test setup T. By Theorem 2, R is an obligation. Then, R
must be trivial by Lemma 1, because R is both a prohibition and an obligation. That R is trivial
contradicts the assumption that R is a nontrivial prohibition. Hence R is not verifiable in any test
setup.
Lemma 7. We split the proof into three parts, reflecting the lemma’s claims.
(1) Let φ be a T∗-refutable property. We show that φ is safety.
Assume pi 6∈ φ, for some pi ∈ Σω. Then, the system Spi = {pi} violates φ. Now, by φ’s T∗-
refutability, there exists a finite set t of φ’s finite prefixes that demonstrates Spi 6∈ Rφ, where Rφ =
⌊φ⌋. Let σ be the longest element in t; note that since {pi} is a singleton, there always exists a single
longest element in t. Then, for any pi′ ∈ Σω, the system Spi′ = {σpi′} violates φ, simply because t
belongs to α(Spi′). We conclude that σpi
′ 6∈ φ, for all pi′ ∈ Σω. That is, φ is a safety temporal property.
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(2) Let φ be a safety property. We show that φ is T∗-refutable.
Assume that a system S violates φ. That is, ∃pi ∈ S. pi 6∈ φ. Since φ is safety, a finite prefix
of pi, say σ, satisfies the following condition: ∀pi′ ∈ Σω. σpi′ 6∈ φ. Now, define the observation t ∈ T∗
as {σ}. Note that t ∈ α(S), and moreover αˆ(t) ∩ Rφ = ∅ due to the above condition. This shows
that φ is T∗-refutable.
(3) Any temporal property φ is Tr-refutable because Rφ’s satisfaction is refinement-closed for
any φ. Then, by Lemmas 1 and 6, any Tr-verifiable or T∗-verifiable property must be trivial. This
completes the proof.
Theorem 3. Let P = ⌊A ∩R⌋. That P is a prohibition is immediate. Below, we prove the contrapos-
itive form of the statement ∀S ∈ A. S 6∈ P ↔ S 6∈ R in two directions.
(1) We show ∀S ∈ A. S ∈ R→ S ∈ P . Let S be a system inA that satisfiesR. Then, S ∈ A∩R,
and hence S ∈ P .
(2) We show ∀S ∈ A. S ∈ P → S ∈ R. Let S be a system in A that satisfies P . We assume
S 6∈ R, and derive a contradiction as follows. From S ∈ P , we conclude that there is a system S′
such that S  S′ and S′ ∈ A∩R. Since R isT-refutable under A, and S ∈ A, there is an observation
t ∈ α(S) such that αˆ(t) ∩A ∩R = ∅. As S  S′, we have S′ ∈ αˆ(t).
From the above results we conclude S′ ∈ αˆ(t) ∩ A ∩ R, which contradicts αˆ(t) ∩ A ∩ R = ∅.
Therefore, S ∈ R, which completes the proof.
30
